Sudan — Military Capability Assessment

The 30.54/100 rests first on Readiness & training (85.00), Combat experience (75.00), Mobilization (69.92). The binding constraints: Air power (8.00), Submarine force (8.00), Nuclear survivability (6.50) — in a causal model, capability can never rise above its weakest observed link. What would move the needle: Air power (8.00) — the weak link in the spending → equipment → readiness → capability chain.

• Alliance architecture adds a +5.78 bonus.
• Nuclear deterrence contributes a capped +0.60 bonus — it cannot manufacture top-tier conventional standing on its own.
• Extreme defense burden applies an economic-strain penalty of −2.00.
• Force mass is capped by what equipment, training and sustainment can actually support — headcount alone scores nothing.

6 of 24 dimensions could not be observed (ISR & intelligence, Missile forces, Air defense, Cyber & space, Strategic lift, Expeditionary capability); missing data caps the score — it never inflates it.

The six sub-scores

All 24 causal dimensions

Assessment coverage: 78.3% — 18 of 24 dimensions observed. Military assessment, run 2026-10-04; evidence snapshot: CIA World Factbook 2026-09-28, SIPRI arms-producer revenue, nuclear taxonomy.

Kernel assessment: Air power 8.00/100 (observed).

Recent acquisitions & orders (dated, sourced)

• Mohajer-6 armed drones (reported) — None (rumored)
  Reuters via Al Jazeera longform: 'The drones being used in Sudan: 1,000 attacks since April 2023' (2026-02-03) — SAF received Iranian drones/parts late 2023-2024 via Port Sudan cargo flights, unconfirmed by army source
• Bayraktar TB2 drones (reported) — None (rumored)
  Critical Threats / AEI via Al Jazeera longform (2026-02-03): Turkey provided Bayraktar drones via Egypt to the SAF source
• Drones and weapons via transnational networks (alleged) — None (rumored)
  CIVICUS Lens: 'Sudan: blood on the hands of foreign powers' (2026-09-21), citing UN Fact-Finding Mission and Reuters (86 UAE cargo flights to Amdjarass, Chad); UAE denies source

Type-by-type inventory in preparation — this dossier deepens as coverage grows. Nothing here is estimated silently.

Kernel assessment: Land warfare 58.20/100 (observed).

Type-by-type inventory in preparation — this dossier deepens as coverage grows. Nothing here is estimated silently.

Kernel assessment: Naval power 22.80/100 (observed).

Type-by-type inventory in preparation — this dossier deepens as coverage grows. Nothing here is estimated silently.

Missile forces could not be observed in this assessment — missing data caps the score, it is never treated as zero.

Type-by-type inventory in preparation — this dossier deepens as coverage grows. Nothing here is estimated silently.

Status: non-nuclear-weapon state (NPT party)

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF): Ground Force (Sudanese Army), Sudanese Navy, Sudanese Air Force; Rapid Support Forces (RSF); Border Guards Ministry of Interior: Sudan Police Forces (SPF), Central Reserve Police (CRP) (2025)

prior to the outbreak of fighting between the SAF and the RSF in 2023, size estimates for Sudan's armed forces varied widely: up to 200,000 SAF; up to 100,000 RSF; up to 80,000 Central Reserve Police (2023)

the SAF's inventory includes a mix of mostly Chinese, Russian/Soviet, and some domestically produced weapons systems; Sudan has a state-run defense industry, which mostly manufactures copies of foreign-supplied armaments, such as armored vehicles, under license (2025)

18-33 years of age for compulsory or voluntary military service for men and women; service obligation 12-24 months (2025)

the primary responsibilities of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) are border control, external defense, and internal security; SAF operations have traditionally been supported by militia and paramilitary forces, particularly the Rapid Support Forces (RSF); in the Spring of 2023, fighting broke out between the SAF and the RSF, particularly around the capital Khartoum and in the western region of Darfur, amid disputes over an internationally-backed plan for a transition towards civilian rule; fighting subsequently spread and continued into 2025 with reports of atrocities, ethnic cleansing, food insecurity, heavy civilian casualties, and millions of internally displaced persons; each side is supported by allied militias and both reportedly have received foreign support the Sudanese military has been a dominant force in the ruling of the country since its independence in 1956; in addition, the military has a large role in the country's economy, reportedly controlling over 200 commercial companies, including businesses involved in gold mining, rubber production, agriculture, and meat exports the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) has operated in the disputed Abyei region along the border between Sudan and South Sudan since 2011; UNISFA's mission includes ensuring security, protecting civilians, strengthening the capacity of the Abyei Police Service, de-mining, monitoring/verifying the redeployment of armed forces from the area, and facilitating the flow of humanitarian aid; as of 2025, UNISFA had approximately 3,800 personnel assigned (2025)